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ABSTRACT
We investigate markets for defaultable sovereign debt in which even though there are many
identical lenders and symmetric information (including no hidden actions), perfect competition does not
obtain. When a private lender allows a sovereign country to increase its level of indebtedness, that lender
implicitly imposes a default externality on others who have lent to that sovereign. That is, in the case
where the borrower would be able to pay back the first loan in the absence of a second loan, the borrower
may have a strong incentive to take both loans and default on both loans. When a lender has  no control
over the actions of other lenders, they must anticipate this behavior and devise a lending strategy that is
consistent with the strategies not only of the sovereign borrower, but also of other lenders. We develop
a model of this strategic lending behavior in the presence of default, and show that even though there are
many competing lenders, the perfectly competitive outcome does not necessarily obtain. Moreover, the
equilibrium can result in monopoly-like outcomes in prices and quantities. We also study the
consequences of intervention in these markets by a seemingly benevolent international financial
institution, and find that these interventions, though well-intentioned, can in some cases be welfare
reducing for sovereign countries and welfare improving for private lenders.
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Discussions about the behavior of international credit markets, and markets
for sovereign debt in particular, are often predicated on one of two very
diﬀerent assumptions about the structure of the markets. If we assume that
markets for sovereign debt are competitive and, if left to their own devices,
borrowers and lenders would organize their activities in an eﬃcient manner
(as they presumably do in many other markets), any intervention by an
institution like the IMF is distortionary and necessarily welfare reducing. On
the other hand, if lenders are assumed to be unable to closely monitor the
behavior of sovereign borrowers and are unable to enforce international debt
contracts, these markets are subject to severe moral hazard problems which
can lead to severe market failures. In this case the IMF’s role is to enhance
private loan markets to reduce fears of market failure and improve the welfare
of both borrowers and lenders. Clearly then, the proper role of intervention
by an institution like the IMF is strongly inﬂuenced by assumptions about
the structure of the market for defaultable sovereign debt.
There is a large literature dealing with a variety of aspects of sovereign
debt markets (see, for example, Eaton and Fernandez (1995), Eichengreen
(1991), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989), and Gibson
and Sundareson (2001), among many others). The foundation for virtually
all of this work, however, is competitive equilibria (with or without frictions).
In this paper, we adopt a diﬀerent perspective on these markets. We maintain
the assumptions that there are many competing lenders and there is symmet-
ric information — assumptions that are typically associated with ﬁrst-best
competitive outcomes. However, we show that the competitive outcome need
not obtain. The ability of a sovereign to retain some of their income in the
case of default induces a “default externality” that lenders must account for
when oﬀering defaultable bond contracts to a sovereign borrower. In other
words, lenders must behave strategically even though they have no compet-
itive or informational advantage.
Our model is one of strategic interactions between lenders and the sovereign
borrower, rather than more abstract bond-market participants. Hence, it is
more likely to apply in situations in which a country doesn’t have access to
liquid international bond markets, but rather must rely on loans from interna-
tional banks. This is common for small countries. For example, throughout
1the 1980’s and 1990’s, Ghana issued no long-term bonds to private creditors,
but borrowed signiﬁcant amounts from commercial banks and other private
lenders. On the other hand, of the $87.5 billion of Mexico’s long-term pub-
lic debt outstanding in 1999, only $9.7 billion came from commercial banks
and private lenders. Our model may also apply when a sovereign’s likeli-
hood of default is very high, hence, it is excluded from further borrowing
in international bond markets, e.g., Argentina in 2001. Overall, banks play
a signiﬁcant role in sovereign debt markets. Banks held 97 percent of all
emerging markets debt at the end of the 1980s. This number fell to roughly
two-thirds by the mid-1990s as the volume of debt grew enormously (see
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) and Bernstein and Penicook (1998)), how-
ever, it is still the dominant form of credit when one excludes the largest
of emerging-market economies e.g., Mexico and Brazil (see Chanda et al
(2001)). Moreover, two necessary assumptions of our model, ﬁrst that loan
contracts are non-exclusive, and second, that sovereign borrowers can shelter
some of their income from creditors in the event of default, seem to apply in
many situations involving private institutions lending to sovereign countries.
Empirical work on sovereign loan markets suggest that standard compet-
itive models of sovereign loan markets do not provide a suﬃcient explanation
for much of what we observe. Edwards (1984) shows that spreads on loans
to sovereign LDCs in the late 1970’s exhibit a lot of variation that cannot
be explained with standard economic factors. (Edwards (1986) demonstrates
that this applies for sovereign bonds as well as loans.) Others have found that
interest-rate spreads on sovereign debt seem puzzling from the perspective
of standard competitive models. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) have docu-
mented that in the early 1990s, much of the variability in interest rate spreads
on emerging market debt is accounted for by a country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect,
and that the explanatory power of economic fundamentals is much less than
standard theory would suggest. In addition, a recent IMF report (Chadha et
al. (2001)) ﬁnds that emerging-market interest-rates do not have a clear re-
lationship with default episodes. They also ﬁnd that emerging market debt
outperforms other comparably risky investments including corporate debt
and even the S&P500 index. Generally, therefore, it is diﬃcult to explain
either the high level or the co-movements with standard economic fundamen-
tals for interest rates observed in sovereign debt contracts. Understanding
these data, therefore, would seem to require a diﬀerent approach.
2Our analysis of sovereign debt markets applies recent work by Parlour
and Rajan (2000) on unsecured personal credit markets. We extend their
model to include random productivity shocks which allows default to be an
observable outcome, as it is in the international debt markets in which the
IMF involves itself. In addition, we introduce an IMF-like institution into
the analysis in a number of diﬀerent ways. We are thereby able to obtain
both positive predictions about the role of IMF activity in the industrial or-
ganization of these debt markets, and also normative predictions about the
welfare consequences of the IMF. Both the Parlour and Rajan (2000) analysis
of unsecured personal credit and our analysis of sovereign debt are related to
earlier applications of asymmetric information and moral hazard to similar
problems. Pauly (1974) has explored equilibria in insurance markets when
existing contracts are unobservable, which is analogous to our non-exclusivity
requirement. Kletzer (1984) explores the existence of competitive Nash equi-
libria in sovereign debt markets in a multi-period model with non-observable
contracts, however, he does not analyze the non-competitive equilibria im-
plied by the non-exclusive contracts in our model. Bizer and DeMarzo (1992)
show that a default externality can arise in a sequential borrowing problem
with moral hazard and seniority. They explore the consequences of this for
interest rates and indebtedness and compare these outcomes to a model with
full commitment.
We show that a range of symmetric, subgame-perfect-Nash equilibria are
supportable in the markets we model. Of particular interest is the case where
in spite of the large number of lenders with symmetric information, the equi-
librium is equivalent (in terms of the equilibrium interest rate and aggregate
loan size), to that of a single monopoly lender. We show that the existence of
this equilibrium depends critically on the fraction of income/output that the
sovereign retains upon default. When this fraction is relatively high, lenders
responding strategically to the default externality will be able to extract
monopoly rents from borrowers. Counter-intuitively, lenders would be made
ex ante worse oﬀ (and conversely, borrowers made better oﬀ) if all of the
sovereign’s income was lost in the case of default. In other words, removing
the default externality would induce competition to the market and eliminate
the monopoly rents. We extend these basic results to contracts with state-
contingent interest rates and ﬁnd that comparable symmetric equilibria with
monopoly-like behavior can be sustained. We also derived conditions under
which these equilibria still exist when debt contracts can be renegotiated ex
3post.
Output volatility plays a key role in our model, both in providing an
environment conducive to non-competitive outcomes, and also in weakening
the link between the terms of loan contracts and competitive fundamentals
like default probabilities. As output becomes more volatile, monopoly-like
equilibria become more likely, and interest rates can be much larger than
would be justiﬁed by default probabilities alone.
From this new perspective, the potential roles for intervention by an in-
stitution like the IMF that have been traditionally advocated, have very dif-
ferent consequences than in both standard competitive models and market-
failure models. We introduce an IMF-like institution into this setting and
explore the consequences of diﬀerent assumptions about its incentives. We
show that if the IMF competes with private lenders for loans but, rather than
maximizing proﬁts, they lend to maximize the utility of the sovereign, the
IMF becomes the “lender of ﬁrst resort” and drives out all private lenders
from a non-competitive equilibrium. If, however, in a monopoly-like equilib-
rium, the institution can only lend a fraction of what private lenders would
provide, the country’s total borrowing and total borrowing costs are unaf-
fected, and the institutions surplus is extracted by private lenders. On the
other hand, if the IMF-like institution operates as a provider of insurance
to sovereign borrowers and lends only in states where the sovereign defaults
(i.e., a “lender of last resort”), a country that is already facing monopoly-like
pricing will receive an increase in welfare. However, this insurance can have
diﬀerent consequences for diﬀerent countries. We show that this insurance
mechanism can push a country that would otherwise face competitive pricing
into a situation where positive-proﬁt equilibria can be sustained.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the theoretical framework for the model.
Section 3 derives a variety of results on existence of equilibria and the com-
petitive and welfare implications of various equilibria. Section 4 introduces a
benchmark model in which analytical results are much clearer, and Section 5
introduces an IMF-like institution into this benchmark model and studies the
positive and normative implications of diﬀerent incentives for this institution.
Section 6 returns to the general speciﬁcation and explores some numerical
examples of the model. In section 7, we show how the monopoly-like equi-
libria might be aﬀected by changes in the economic environment by allowing
4state-contingent debt contracts and renegotiation. Section 8 concludes the
paper.
2 The market for defaultable sovereign loans
In this section we describe the basic framework for our analysis of com-
petition in sovereign loan markets. There are potentially many identical
lenders and one sovereign borrower. All information is symmetric and com-
plete. In other words, there is no adverse selection or moral hazard in this
model. There are two time periods. In the initial period, the lenders and
the sovereign borrower agree upon a set of debt contracts such that the debt
market clears. In the second period, the stochastic output is realized, debts
are repaid (or not), and consumption takes place. All agents, both borrowers
and lenders, are risk neutral and have rational expectations. Therefore, they
each seek to maximize (at least initially) the expected value of second-period
consumption. The sovereign country, however, has the ability to abandon
its commitment to pay back its loans in the second period, and will do so
whenever its ex post consumption is larger in default than under the terms
of the loan contracts. Lenders can anticipate these strategic defaults and
will adjust contract oﬀerings accordingly. This strategic behavior generates
complex interactions between borrowers and lenders, and the potential for
non-competitive market outcomes in what would appear to be an otherwise
simple and transparent setting.
Before exploring these possibilities in detail, we ﬁrst specify the economic
environment. Lenders, denoted i = 1;2;:::;M, compete by oﬀering a one-
period debt contract to the sovereign country. Each contract speciﬁes the
loan’s principal, di, and interest rate, ri. The sovereign uses these loans to
produce output using a production function given by
f(x; ˜ µ) = ˜ µAx
¯ ; (1)
where 0 < ¯ < 1, A > 0, and ˜ µ is a stochastic productivity shock. The
ex post value of the shock is public knowledge. For simplicity, we assume
that there are two possible realizations for this shock, fµL;µHg, such that
µH > µL ¸ 0. (We will often assume that µH = 1, and µL = 0, to simplify
the analysis even further.) The probability of the high state is denoted as p.
5An important assumption of this model is the sovereign’s potential to
both default and maintain positive consumption while in default. To capture
this, we assume that in the case of default, the sovereign can shield a fraction
° of output from their creditors, where 0 · ° · 1. That is, the most that a
sovereign can be punished for defaulting is a fraction (1¡°) of second-period
output. Therefore, when ° = 1, the sovereign pays nothing back to lenders
and consumes all of their output, and when ° = 0, the sovereign consumes
nothing in the case of default. Given this assumption, the sovereign will
default on all of its creditors whenever ex post consumption in default is










(1 + ri)di ; (2)
where we assume that the only input to production comes from sovereign
debt, and that
PM
i=1(1+ ri)di is the principal and interest owed on all loans.
It is obvious from the expression in equation (2) that a lender acting in
anticipation of a potential default, must be concerned not only with that
lender’s own loans, but also the loans of all other lenders.
A second key assumption of this model is that a lender cannot force
the sovereign to commit to accepting only one loan contract and, similarly, a
lender cannot preclude others from lending to the same sovereign. Therefore,
each additional loan contract increases the likelihood of default on all loan
contracts. Each loan contract increases the likelihood of default. In other
words, if the total amount oﬀered by all lenders is large enough, the sovereign
country can choose to accept all loans and default on all loans, independently
of the interest rates charged on these loans. Therefore, by oﬀering a loan
contract, each lender creates a negative externality for every other lender,
since each loan increases the incentive of the sovereign to default on all loans.
As with most externality problems, there can be multiple equilibria in this
economy. We will restrict our attention to symmetric pure-strategy subgame-
perfect Nash equilibria in which every lender oﬀers a positive amount and the
country accepts all debt contracts. Although these assumptions may rule out
some interesting behavior, this approach is relatively tractable analytically,
yet yields a suﬃciently rich set of equilibria to generate interesting non-
competitive outcomes which we can use to frame both positive and normative
6issues in sovereign debt markets. We make these equilibrium assumptions
more speciﬁc in the next section.
3 Loan market equilibria
A lender chooses a contract fdi;rig to maximize the expected value of proﬁts:
q[(1 + ri)di] + (1 ¡ q)¯ d ¡ di ; (3)
where q is the probability that they will be repaid by the sovereign borrower,
¯ d is the amount that the lender receives in the case of default, and the risk-
free interest rate is assumed to be zero. (This is without loss of generality,
since we could deﬁne ri to be the excess return on sovereign lending.) We
also assume for simplicity that the lenders receive nothing from the sovereign
in the case of default. Hence, ¯ d = 0, will be maintained from now on. The
fraction (1 ¡ °) of output is simply a deadweight loss to the economy.
Given that there are two states of the world, lenders face two alternatives.
They can lend an amount such that the sovereign country decides to default
in the low state but pays back in the high state, or they can oﬀer contracts
such that the sovereign is better oﬀ paying back in both states of the world.
Given the default externality described above, the probability of repayment,
q, depends on the lender’s own actions, di and ri, the set of contracts oﬀered
by other lenders, fd¡i;r¡ig (in obvious notation), the stochastic production
process with parameters µ, p, A, and ¯, and also on the default-consumption
parameter, °:
q(di;ri;fd¡i;r¡ig;µ;A;¯;p;°) 2 f0;p;1g ; (4)
The probability of repayment will be equal to 1 if the sovereign country
repays the loans in both states of the world, it will equal p if the country
pays back only in the high state, and it will equal 0 if the country never
repays the loans. Note that if q is equal to 0 the lender’s expected proﬁts are
maximized at 0, , i.e., the optimal contract is to set di equal to 0.
Given the set of contracts oﬀered by all lenders, the sovereign country
decides which contracts to accept in the ﬁrst period, and whether to repay
or default in the second period.
7Deﬁnition: A symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is a set of con-
tracts, fd;rg; such that
1. for each lender i
fd;rg = argmax
di;ri
q(di;ri;fd;rg;µ;p;A;¯;°)(1 + ri)di ¡ di ;
2. the country accepts all contracts oﬀered, and
3. q 2 f0;p;1g is consistent with the sovereign country’s decision to de-
fault.
Finding an equilibrium, therefore, requires further characterization of the
repayment probability, q, which is contingent on the country’s default de-
cision. The country will evaluate default contingency by contingency, and
form an expected value accordingly. For an arbitrary interest rate r and loan




H) ¡ (1 + r)d; °f(d;µ
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Note that when µL is greater than zero, the country might be willing to repay
even in the low state.
If the country does not default in either state of the world, debt contracts
are completely riskless. If, in addition, markets are competitive, then the
equilibrium interest rate must be equal to the risk-free rate, which is assumed
to be equal to zero. Expected utility, therefore, is given by
f(d;E[˜ µ]) ¡ d :
The country’s optimal loan size in this no-default case is denoted as ˆ dND,
and is the solution to
argmax
d
f(d;E[˜ µ]) ¡ d :
The largest loan consistent with repayment in both states, denoted as ¯ dL, is
not necessarily equal to ˆ dND. Rather, it is determined by the lowest state
alone (since if default is not optimal in the low state, it cannot be optimal




L) = f(¯ d
L;µ
L) ¡ (1 + r)¯ d
L :




ND = minf¯ dL; ˆ dNDg, and rC
ND = 0.
Note that for ° high enough and a concave production function,2 the loan
amount that maximizes the country’s surplus, ˆ dND, will be larger than the
amount that induces repayment in both states of the world, ¯ dL. For our














This leads to our ﬁrst theorem which states that a competitive equilibrium
will not exist for values of ° suﬃciently high. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the value of ° for
which ˆ dND = ¯ dL:








Theorem 1 There are no riskless competitive equilibria when ° > °ND.
(The proof of this theorem is a straightforward extension of the proof of
Theorem 3, below.)
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If ˆ dND is greater than
¯ dL, the marginal lender can always oﬀer a contract with a lower principal
amount and a higher interest rate instead of the competitive contract. Since
accepting this new contract will increase the country’s utility, the competitive
contract cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
Equilibria with default
2For the competitive contract to make sense in this risky environment, we require that
¯ > µ
L
µH , which we assume throughout.
9If the country chooses to default in the low state, but repays in the high
state, the debt contracts become risky. Since p is the probability of default
in this case, the marginal cost of funds to any lender is 1=p, which would also
be the interest rate in a competitive environment. The country’s expected
utility in this case is given by
pf(d;µ
H) + (1 ¡ p)°f(d;µ
L) ¡ d : (6)
Analagous to the no-default case, we can deﬁne a contract size, ¯ dH, such that
the country is just indiﬀerent to defaulting or repaying in the high state:










H) + (1 ¡ p)°f(d;µ
L) ¡ d :




D = minf¯ dH; ˆ dDg, and rC
D = 1=p.
As before, for ° high enough the loan amount that maximizes the coun-
try’s surplus will be larger than the amount that induces repayment in the
















Hence we have a second theorem that again rules out competitive equilibria
when ° is suﬃciently high. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the value of ° for which ˆ dD = ¯ dH:
°D =
pµH
pµH + (1 ¡ p)µL¯
(1 ¡ ¯) :
Theorem 2 There are no risky competitive equilibria when ° > °D.
10The intuition behind this result is directly analagous to Theorem 1. The
main implication of these two theorems is that in a setting where ° is rela-
tively large, we cannot rely on the predictions of competitive equilibria even
when the number of symmetric lenders is extremely large. There are many
non-competitive equilibria that one might consider at this point. We will fo-
cus our attention primarily on a monopoly equilibrium. That is, we explore
whether an equilibrium in this sovereign debt market with many lenders can
exhibit the same interest rate and loan size as a market dominated by a single
monopolist. To develop intuition for this result, we ﬁrst simplify the stochas-
tic process which, in turn, simpliﬁes the analytical expressions that deﬁne
the equilibria without aﬀecting the basic qualitative results of the model.
4 A benchmark case
In this section, we simplify the model by assuming µH = 1;µL = 0: This
guarantees that there is no equilibrium were the country does not default in
the low state, since they have no output in that case, f(d;µL = 0) = 0. We
also write f(d;µH = 1) as simply f(d).
Competitive equilibria
We will begin by deﬁning the competitive contract for this case. Given
that investors are risk neutral and that the country will only be able to repay
in the high state, in a competitive market the interest rate will be equal to
1=p. If the country had the ability to choose how much debt to borrow at










Therefore, the optimal (from the country’s perspective) debt level, ˆ d, is such
that f0(ˆ d) = 1=p, which is given by
ˆ d = [pA¯]
1
1¡¯ :
However, a commitment by the country to repay lenders in the high state










(1 + ri)di :
11Deﬁne,¯ d; as the debt level such that the country is indiﬀerent between repay-










p, which is given
by
¯ d = [pA(1 ¡ °)]
1
1¡¯ :
Therefore, the value of ° for which ˆ d = ¯ d is given by
°NC = 1 ¡ ¯ :
Theorem 3 There are no zero proﬁt equilibria when ° > °NC.
Proof: The proof follows the proof of Proposition 3 of Parlour and Rajan
(2000). By contradiction, suppose that ° > 1 ¡ ¯ and that ri = 1
p. It must
be the case that
P
i di · ¯ d, otherwise default would be optimal. Furthermore,







Consider a lender, i, that oﬀers a positive amount. If there is no other
lender oﬀering a positive amount, then the monopolistic contract is optimal.
Therefore, there must exist at least another lender, j, with dj > 0: Let d¡i =
P
j6=i dj: It must be the case that ¯ d ¡ d¡i ¸ di > 0: Furthermore, since the
surplus is increasing for d < ¯ d, we have that °f(d¡i) < f(d¡i)¡
d¡i
p . Hence,





f(d¡i + ") ¡
d¡i+"
p : Thus, there is a ± such that
f(d¡i + ") ¡
d¡i + "
p
¡ ±" > max
Ã





Set di = " and ri = 1
p + ± ¡ 1. Clearly, " and ± can be chosen such that
lender i makes a proﬁt.
An immediate implication of this theorem is that countries with close to
linear production functions, i.e., ¯ close to 1, are likely to face noncompetitive
pricing even when ° is close to 0.
12If the competitive outcome obtains, then lenders’ expected proﬁts are













We can say more about the non-competitive equilibria in this debt market.
We now show that for ° suﬃciently large, a symmetric monopoly contract can
be sustained as an equilibrium. Moreover, this result will hold independently
of the number of lenders. Increasing the number of lenders, therefore, does
not result in a competitive outcome.
If this market was dominated by a single lender, the monopolist would
solve:
maxr;d p(1 + r)d ¡ d
s:t: (1 ¡ °)f (d) ¸ (1 + r)d ;
and the optimal contract would satisfy
d








Note that the size of the loan decreases with °. In fact, if ° = 1, i.e., the
country can consume all of its output in the case of default, then dM = 0:
The interest rate is independent of the value of °, but it does depend on the
value of ¯. That is, the greater the curvature in the production function,
i.e., the smaller the value of ¯, the larger the monopoly interest rate. This
interest rate compounds a compensation for risk, 1
p, and a monopoly mark-up
1
¯.
Lenders who adopt this monopoly-price strategy run the risk of being un-
dercut by a lender who can earn higher expected proﬁts by making a larger
loan at a lower interest rate. We will examine these strategies further in
section 6 and the Appendix, however, it is worth spending a bit of time
developing some intuition for the unproﬁtability of defection from this sym-
metric monopoly equilibrium. Imagine ﬁrst a market dominated by a single
13monopolist. Another lender considers the possibility of ﬁnding a proﬁtable
entry strategy. The lender might think of oﬀering an additional loan at a
lower rate. Note that the borrower is still credit constrained at the monopoly
equilibrium, hence, the country will readily accept this new loan oﬀer. How-
ever, note in addition, that the monopolist has extracted all of the possible
rents in the good productivity state, so that repayment would be possible
only if the new loan was oﬀered below cost. Otherwise, the acceptance of the
new loan would push the country to default even in the good state. In either
case, this new loan is unproﬁtable. The lender’s only hope is to try to take
over the monopolist’s position. That is, to oﬀer a large loan at a lower rate
that the country will accept instead of the monopolist’s contract. However,
for ° suﬃciently large, and given the non-exclusivity of loan contracts, the
country will be better oﬀ taking both the monopolist’s loan and the entrant’s
large loan and defaulting on both. Once again, the potential entrant is left
without a proﬁtable strategy.
In the case with many lenders, the intuition is very similar. For a lender
to oﬀer a bigger loan, without inducing the country to reduce their borrowing
from one of the other lenders, simply induces default for the same reason as
with the single monopolist. On the other hand, oﬀering a larger loan that
is attractive to the borrower and that will displace one of the other lenders
is confronted with the same default problem as before. For ° suﬃciently
large, the country will not substitute the new larger loan for an old one, but
will prefer to take all loans oﬀered and default on all loans. Lenders will
see that there is no scope for a proﬁtable departure from the monopoly-price
equilibrium, and the equilibrium will be sustainable. Note in both cases,
however, that the sustainability of this equilibrium depends critically on the
value of °. For small values of °, rather than defaulting, the country could
be better oﬀ simply replacing expensive loans with cheaper ones which would
result in standard Bertand competition.





¡ 1)[p(1 ¡ °)A¯]
1
1¡¯ : (7)
Figure 1 depicts these monopoly proﬁts for various values of ¯ and °. Proﬁts
are increasing in ¯ and decreasing in ° (recall proﬁts are zero when ° = 1).
Moreover, proﬁts can be extremely large when the country cannot keep much






































Note: The ﬁgure depicts the expected proﬁts of a monopolist lender.
15of their output in the case of default, i.e., ° close to 0, and the production
function is close to linear, i.e., ¯ close to 1. Nevertheless, even though
proﬁts are potentially large, the monopoly outcome cannot be sustained as
an equilibrium for small values of °.
The main conclusion of this section is that in an environment where
sovereign countries are able shelter a large fraction of their income when
they default, i.e., ° high, interest rates are higher than the cost of capital,
and a country will be able to borrow less than it could in a competitive
market.
5 Policies of a benevolent lending institution
In this section we analyze how an international organization such as the IMF
could inﬂuence equilibrium outcomes in the market for sovereign debt. For
simplicity we will continue with the assumption in the benchmark model of
the last section: µL = 0 and µH = 1. We analyze two possible cases. In
the ﬁrst case we consider an IMF-like lender who enters this sovereign debt
market and makes loans at competitive interest rates. We ask whether this
activity could alter the structure of the market equilibrium and, in particular,
whether it would induce competition or promote monopoly-like outcomes.
In the second case, we assume that the IMF-like institution acts like an
insurance provider for the sovereign country. That is, the sovereign country
buys insurance from the institution against the prospect of the low state and
potential default. Again we ask whether this activity deters or promotes
competition in these markets.
A Lender of “First Resort”
Suppose the international institution is both able and willing to oﬀer
a loan as large as the sovereign country needs at the competitive interest
rate. In a fairly obvious way, any private lenders not oﬀering competitive
loans would be driven out of the market, and all proﬁts would be driven to
zero. Therefore, if the IMF-like institution seeks to maximize a sovereign
country’s welfare by becoming an alternative source of competitively-priced
loans, then there is an equilibrium where this institution becomes the “lender
of ﬁrst resort”, i.e., the only lender.
16Perhaps more realistically we assume that the institution lacks the re-
sources to do this on a large scale. In particular, let the maximum amount
that the institution can lend be equal to
dI = Ád
M;
where Á is a number between zero and one, and dM denotes the amount that
a monopolistic lender would choose, i.e.,
d
M = [p(1 ¡ °)A¯]
1
1¡¯ :
Note that provided that the institution does not lend enough to drive out
private lenders, the theorems above will still hold. That is, for ° suﬃciently
large, there will be no zero-proﬁt equilibria in the market for private loans
to sovereign countries. This activity may lead to both increases in the coun-
try’s utility and decreases in the proﬁts of private lenders, however, it is not
suﬃcient to bring about a competitive equilibrium.
To illustrate the eﬀects that this limited lending at competitive rates
can have on a monopolistic equilibrium, we will analyze how the symmetric
monopolistic outcome changes with this institutional intervention.
In this case lenders solve:
max
di;ri











(1 + ri)di ¸ °f(
M X
i=1
di + dI) :




di = (1 ¡ Á)d
M ;





17Note that this implies that the cost to the country of servicing the total debt










which is independent of the value of Á. The cost to the country is the same
when the IMF-like institution does a lot of low-cost lending or very little.
All beneﬁts of these low-interest loans are extracted by the strategic private
lenders who implement the monopoly strategy.
An implication of this equilibrium is that as Á ! 1 the interest rate
charged by the international lenders goes to inﬁnity and the amount they
lend goes to zero. Therefore, if the symmetric monopolistic outcome obtains,
limited institutional lending at competitive rates does not change either the
total amount lent to the country or the cost to the country of servicing their
debt.
Figure 3 depicts the increase in the value of ° necessary to sustain the
monopoly outcome as the size of the IMF loan increases. What this shows
is that even when the size of the loan oﬀered by the institution is relatively
small, since this loan reduces the scope for monopoly-like equilibria (i.e., such
equilibria can only be sustained for larger values of °), it could ultimately be
welfare enhancing for the country.
An Insurance Provider
Suppose the sovereign country can buy insurance against the low state
from the IMF-like institution. In particular, assume that if the low state
occurs then the institution pays the country’s debts to private lenders. In
exchange for this insurance, the sovereign country pays a premium, ¼, when
the high state is realized. The insurance is contracted before the private
credit market opens. In addition, we assume that the institution pays oﬀ
the country’s creditors in the low state only if the contracts are written such
that the country is able to repay both the premium and its debts in the high
state. Since there is symmetric information in this economy, ruling out moral
hazard in the high state seems reasonable.
The payment of the insurance premium has a consequence on the resulting
equilibrium. Recall that whenever ˆ d > ¯ d (that is, whenever the amount that
18Figure 2: Monopoly Threshold Value of ° vs. IMF Loan Size
















Monopoly Threshold g (A=10, b=0.5, p=0.8)
Note: The ﬁgure depicts the threshold value for ° needed to sustain the monopoly
outcome as the size of the loan made by the IMF (measured by Á) changes.
19the country would like to borrow is greater than the amount that they can
credibly commit to repay), competitive equilibria cannot exist. In addition,
recall that with complete insurance, the competitive interest rate will be
driven down to the risk-free interest rate, assumed to be zero. The eﬀect of
this lower rate is to increase both the country’s demand, i.e., ˆ d increases,
and its ability to credibly repay, i.e., ¯ dincreases. This eﬀect on ¯ d, however,
is mitigated since the country has to pay the insurance premium in the good
state, which lowers the amount of resources available to repay its debts. The
net eﬀect is to increase the distance between ˆ d and ¯ d, which will rule out
competitive contracts for even small values of °. In other words, the beneﬁts
of this type of intervention must be weighed against its negative consequences
for competition.
To see the potential beneﬁts of intervention in the case of a symmetric
monopoly equilibrium, (i.e., ° suﬃciently large), consider the objective of a
lender operating in the presence of this institutional insurance mechanism.








di) ¡ ¼ ¡
M X
i=1




The constraint guarantees that in the high state the country pays the insur-
ance premium and the interest rates on the loans. The loan size and interest


















¡ 1 : (11)
When default is insured by the institution, we can obtain lenders’ ex-








1¡¯ ¡ ¼ :
20Recall that proﬁts in the comparable equilibrium without insurance are given
in equation (7). Note that proﬁts in the insured case diﬀer from the uninsured
case in two ways. Proﬁts rise as a result of the increase in the total amount
lent to the country (this amount is higher since it no longer depends on p).
But proﬁts also fall by the amount of the premium paid by the country to the
institution. Therefore, even though the structure of the insurance mechanism
would lead one to believe that the country is paying for the insurance, in
equilibrium, the insurance premium is actually funded through lower proﬁts.
The expected proﬁts of private lenders depend in a fairly obvious way on
the insurance pricing. Assuming ° is high, if the insurance is cheap bankers
will be better oﬀ since the insurance mechanism will allow them to increase
the loan amounts and they will still obtain positive proﬁts. On the other
hand, if the premium is large, the rents that bankers can extract from the
country will drop and they will be worse oﬀ.
As a benchmark, consider the situation in which the institution charges
the sovereign country an actuarially fair price for this insurance. The pre-














Note that this interest rate will be lower than 1
¯ ¡ 1, the interest rate in
monopoly equilibrium without uncertainty.









which are smaller than the proﬁts lenders earn without the insurance mecha-
nism. In other words, to make lenders better oﬀ under this insurance scheme,
the institution would have to subsidize insurance, and charge a lower pre-
mium than would be actuarily fair.
21The country’s expected utility in this monopoly equilibrium with in-
surance is strictly larger than the comparable uninsured case. Since the
monopoly equilibrium will result in equality in the constraint given in equa-
tion (9), we know that expected utility in the insured case is given by
p°f(dI
M), compared to the uninsured case, p°f(dM). Since the country is
able to borrow more when their loans are insured, i.e., dI
M > dM, utility for
the country is strictly larger with insurance.
This welfare improvement is somewhat oﬀset by the aﬀect that insur-
ance may have on competition. Since the lending institution is extracting
resources from the country in the good state whenever ¼ > 0, the amount
that the country can credibly commit to repay in the good state will be lower.
Therefore, the default externality can rule out competitive equilibria for even
smaller values of °. Overall, this insurance mechanism can have very diﬀer-
ent eﬀects for diﬀerent countries since the presence of the insurance decreases
the value of ° above which the competitive equilibrium cannot be sustained.
That is, the insurance mechanism can push a country that faces competitive
pricing into an equilibrium in which foreign investors gain positive proﬁts,
which can have a substantial negative impact on the country’s welfare. On
the other hand, if a country is already facing monopoly pricing, then the
insurance will increase its welfare. In general, countries with large values of
° will tend to beneﬁt from the insurance, whereas countries with low values
of ° may be better oﬀ without it.
6 The general model revisited
The simple benchmark model allowed us to study in a relatively clear way,
the implications of an intervention in this sovereign debt market by an in-
ternational ﬁnancial institution. Given the restrictive assumption made on
the stochastic productivity shock, however, the benchmark model does not
allow us to study the consequences of diﬀerent stochastic processes for the
equilibrium in this market. We now return to the general speciﬁcation to
explore these cases in more detail, with special emphasis on the monopolistic
equilibria that might obtain.
22Recall that there are two types of monopolistic equilibria. There is a
monopoly-like equilibrium with default in the low state and another where
the country never defaults. Given that we do in fact observe defaults in
sovereign debt markets, and since the monopoly-like equilibrium without de-
fault can only be sustained when the productivity shock has a very small
variance, we will restrict our analysis to the equilibria where the country
defaults in the low state. Given the need to explore all forms of proﬁtable
defections from the symmetric monopoly equilibrium, and the complexity of
these possible strategies for the more general stochastic productivity shock,
we are unable to ﬁnd simple closed-form expressions for the restrictions on
the structure of the economy that admit monopoly equilibria. We summa-
rize these conditions in the Appendix and show that they correspond to a
relatively simple constrained optimization problem. For speciﬁc examples of
the theoretical economy. These problems are easy to solve numerically. We
now analyze these equilibria for a variety of numerical examples.
To study the eﬀects of volatility on equilibrium outcomes, we parameter-
ize the states using the mean, variance and probability:
µ















Therefore, E[˜ µ] = ¹ and V ar(˜ µ) = ¾2. The following graphs show the (°;¾)
pairs for which the symmetric monopolistic outcome obtains in equilibrium.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 depict the threshold values of ° that will support the
monopoly equilibrium for large values of M.
A number of patterns in the relationship between the productivity-shock
parameters and sustainability of a monopoly-price equilibrium emerge from
these numerical results. The value of ° that would support a monopoly-price
equilibrium decreases as:
1. the mean decreases
2. volatility increases, and
23Figure 3: Threshold Values for °D (p=0.5)

















Monopoly Default Threshold for g (p=0.5, A=10, b=0.5)
3. the probability of the high state increases.
The lenders’ strategy in case of the monopoly-price equilibrium involves a
tradeoﬀ between the cost of default when the low state occurs and the proﬁts
earned when the high state occurs. Therefore, to interpret these patterns,
it is helpful to think in terms of the debt capacity of the country in the low
state and the interest rate charged by lenders who adopt the monopoly-price
strategy. In general, when ¾ is relatively small, the debt burden that the
country can repay in both states of the world will also be relatively large,
since µL is close to µH. In a monopoly-price equilibrium a large fraction
of this debt burden will be interest rather than principal since the interest
rate charged by the typical lender following the monopoly strategy will be
very high. To see that monopoly-price equilibria can only be sustained for
countries with high values of ° when ¾ is small (or µL is relatively large),
consider the incentives of the marginal lender to oﬀer a contract such that
the country will repay in the low state. If all other lenders are following
the monopoly-price strategy, the marginal lender may have an incentive to
24Figure 4: Threshold Values for °D (p=0.2)

















Monopoly Default Threshold for g (p=0.2, A=10, b=0.5)
deviate and oﬀer a larger contract at a lower interest rate. (For example, if
this interest rate is suﬃciently low and µL is suﬃciently high that the debt
burden is small enough that it can be repaid even in the low state, then
the marginal lender may increase proﬁts by deviating from the monopoly
strategy.) If this deviation is attempted for a country with a large value of
°, i.e., a country for which there is little penalty associated with default,
the country would be willing to accept but not repay a contract at a lower
interest rate. In that case, a lender would have no incentive to deviate from
the monopoly strategy. Therefore, when ¾ is relatively small, the monopoly-
price strategy will only be an equilibrium for countries with relatively high
values of °.
Note that the other patterns displayed in these ﬁgures, i.e., mean increase,
and high-state probability decrease, result in an increase in µL. Their eﬀects
on the sustainability of a monopoly equilibrium are all very similar to the
decrease in ¾ described in detail above. As µL increases, the monopoly equi-
librium can only be sustained for countries with increasingly higher values of
°.
25Figure 5: Threshold Values for °D (p=0.8)

















Monopoly Default Threshold for g (p=0.8, A=10, b=0.5)
Another way to see these eﬀects is to look at the condition that allows
proﬁtable deviation. Proﬁtable deviation will be possible only if:
(1 ¡ °)µ
Lf(d




M > di ;
where the dM is the total amount of loans oﬀered under the monopoly-price
contract, and di is the size of the defector’s loan.3 Note that the three
parameter changes discussed above all act to decrease the left-hand side of
this inequality, hence, making deviation impossible.
Instead of analyzing the symmetric monopolistic outcome, one could ask
whether a single monopolist could corner the market in such a way that it
is optimal for other lenders not to oﬀer any loans. One can show that a
single monopolist can indeed corner the market, provided ° and ¾ are high
enough, as shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6. The intuition is basically the same.
3This restriction assumes that the country accepts all contracts. The appendix deals
with the more general case where the country is allowed to accept only a fraction of the
contracts oﬀered.
26For ¾ high enough, oﬀering contracts such that the country repays in both
states of the world is not possible because there is just not enough output
produced in the low state. Furthermore, for ° high enough, the country will
be able to consume a large fraction of the total output in default, and hence
any contract oﬀered with an interest rate higher than 1
p will induce default.
Given that the monopoly contract is being oﬀered, there is no possibility to
enter the market and generate a positive proﬁt. Therefore, the other lenders
will optimally oﬀer the contract d = 0, r = 0.4
7 Extensions
In this section we examine three important extensions to the basic model
presented above. First we consider the case of state-contingent debt con-
tracts. We allow lenders to index the interest rate to the realization of the
productivity shock. Given the assumption of full and symmetric informa-
tion, this seems like a natural contract for lenders to oﬀer. In this context,
we also extend the model to allow a more general multiple-state (i.e., more
than 2-states) stochastic process. Finally, we allow for renegotiation in the
case of default. Working in the context of a relatively static model, our spec-
iﬁcation of renegotiation is necessarily simple, however, it yields results that
are suggestive for the likely consequence of allowing renegotiation in a more
dynamic setting.
7.1 Contingent Contracts and Multiple States
In the previous sections we have assumed that lenders oﬀer standard debt
contracts. Here we show that if state-contingent contracts are oﬀered in-
stead, the monopoly-like equilibrium can still be sustained for suﬃciently
large values of °. Furthermore, we show that in this case the monopoly prof-
its increase relative to non-contingent contracting, since the monopoly rents
can be extracted from the country in all states by charging diﬀerent rates in
4Numerical examples have also shown that this monopoly approach may also provide
a simpler numerical algorithm for ﬁnding the symmetric Nash equilibrium, relative to the
method detailed in section 6.
27the diﬀerent states of the world. Generalization to a multiple-state stochastic
process is straightforward.
Consider the case where there is a single monopolist lender.5 This lender
oﬀers a contract fdM;rM(µi)gi=1;:::K. The state µi occurs with probability
p(µi): Denote the mean of the productivity shock as ¯ µ =
P
i p(µi)µi. The






p(µi)(1 + r(µi))d ¡ d (12)
subject to the state-by-state repayment constraints
(1 ¡ °)f (d;µi) ¸ (1 + r(µi))d ; (13)
for all i.









¯ µ(1 ¡ °)A¯
i 1
1¡¯ :
The following theorem establishes that this monopoly equilibrium can be
sustained provided ° is suﬃciently large.
Theorem 4 There exists a value of ° for which the monopoly contract can
be sustained as an equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose there is a lender oﬀering the monopoly contract and the rest
are oﬀering the zero contract. If lender j deviates and oﬀers another contract,
say fdj;rj(µi)g, for i = 1;:::K, then the country has two options. If it accepts




















5The extension to the symmetric monopoly equilibrium with many lenders is straight-
forward.










































Hence we have that






dj ¡ dj = 0 :
Next, we will show that for ° suﬃciently large the country will always
prefer to take both contracts. Consider the country’s utility. If the country

























For lender j to make a proﬁt we need
P
i p(µi)(1 + rj(µi)) > 1. If the country
accepts only the contract oﬀered by lender j then its utility equals
X
i
p(µi)[µif (dj) ¡ (1 + rj(µi))dj] < ¯ µf (dj) ¡ dj :






> ¯ µf (dj) ¡ dj :



















¯ µ(1 ¡ °)A¯
i 1
1¡¯ ;
proﬁts are larger with state-contingent contracts than with a non-contingent
debt contract. In the monopoly-price equilibrium, the state-contingent con-
tracts allow lenders to extract the maximum amount of proﬁt in each state.
297.2 Renegotiation
Up until now, we have assumed that if the country defaults, lenders loose
the entire principal of their loan and the country consumes only a fraction of
their output. Therefore, default represents a deadweight loss to the economy.
In this section, we would ask how sensitive the results are to this assump-
tion. In particular, we could like to know how an ex post renegotiation in
which the lender can potentially recapture some of their capital would aﬀect
the equilibrium. Clearly this will depend on how renegotiation is modeled.
For example, assume that lending is dominated by a single monopolist and
another lender, say lender j, oﬀers a contract that pushes the country into
default. If lender j is able to extract a large fraction of the output through a
renegotiation then it might indeed be proﬁtable for him to enter the market
even though it induces the country to default. The logic of this example will
also translate to the symmetric monopoly problem
To further illustrate this point, consider a deterministic economy. That is,
µH = µL = 1: Assume there is a monopolist lender oﬀering a debt contract




= 1: We’ve shown that if ° is large, this is an
equilibrium. Assume that lender j enters the market and oﬀers a contract
such that the country decides to default. Furthermore, assume that lender j is











¡ dj > 0 :
Alternatively, lender j will enter the market provided its marginal revenue is















The second term on the right-hand side of this inequality is less than one
by concavity of f. The ﬁrst term is positive, but its magnitude depends on
6The fraction ± could conceivably also depend on rj. We abstract from that case to rule
out a strategy in which lender j could oﬀer a contract with rj = 1 when ± is increasing
in rj, and get all the surplus from the renegotiation.
30@±(dj;dM)
@dj . Therefore, the entry decision for lender j depends critically on the
rate at which the amount recovered during the renegotiation increases with
loan size. For example, if ± was a constant that was suﬃciently smaller than
1, i.e., there is still a signiﬁcant dead-weight loss associated with default, the
symmetric monopoly equilibrium would be preserved even with the prospect
of a renegotiation ex post. Note that this logic extends quite naturally to the
case of a random productivity shock.
8 Conclusion
We have shown how non-competitive outcomes can be sustained in sovereign
credit markets even though there are many lenders and complete and sym-
metric information. By extending the model of Parlour and Rajan (2000)
to include stochastic productivity shocks and equilibrium default, we derive
conditions under which perfectly competitive equilibria can be ruled out.
Moreover, we show that given a suﬃciently large incentive for a sovereign
country to default, i.e., the sovereign can consume a relatively large share of
their output in the case of default, monopoly-like outcomes for interest rates
and loan size can be sustained as equilibria. The existence of monopoly-
like equilibria in these types of markets depends critically on the fraction of
income that the sovereign can retain in the case of default, and on the distri-
bution of random productivity shocks that governs default probabilities. We,
therefore, solve for threshold values of this fraction that change with the pro-
duction technology and the properties of the stochastic productivity shock.
Counter-intuitively, given the possibility of a non-competitive equilibrium,
the sovereign country would be better oﬀ if it were unable to consume any
of its income in the case of default. Lenders, on the other hand, can beneﬁt
greatly in equilibrium from a sovereign country’s ability to consume in de-
fault. In addition, our model has the property that output volatility plays
a key role both in providing an environment conducive to non-competitive
outcomes, and also to breaking the link between the terms of loan contracts
and competitive fundamentals like default probabilities. As output becomes
more volatile, monopoly-like equilibria become more likely, and interest rates
can be much larger than would be justiﬁed by default probabilities alone.
We also explore how a benevolent institution like the IMF can aﬀect
31equilibrium outcomes in these markets. Depending on the incentives of the
institution, the outcomes can be somewhat surprising. We show that if in a
monopoly equilibrium the IMF oﬀers loans at competitive interest rates, it
drives out all private lenders, thereby becoming the “lender of ﬁrst resort.” If
the IMF can only lend a fraction of the loans that private lenders would pro-
vide, the country’s total borrowing and total borrowing costs are unaﬀected,
and the institution’s surplus is extracted by private lenders.
Alternatively, if we model the IMF as an insurance mechanism for sovereign
borrowers that lends only in states where the sovereign defaults (i.e., a
“lender of last resort”), a country that is already facing monopoly-like pricing
will receive an increase in welfare. However, this type of insurance mecha-
nism can push a country that might otherwise face competitive pricing into
a situation where positive-proﬁt equilibria, or even monopoly-like equilibria,
can be sustained.
Finally, we show how the monopoly-like equilibria might be aﬀected by
changes in the economic environment. In particular, we show that most of
our results will hold even when lenders are allowed to oﬀer state-contingent
debt contracts in an environment with many states, and when we allow for
the possibility of renegotiation.
32References
Bernstein, Robert J., and John A. Penicook Jr. (1998). “Emerging Market
Debt: Practical Portfolio Considerations,” in Emerging Market Capital
Flows, Richard Levich (Ed.), New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.
335-373.
Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth Rogoﬀ (1989). “Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive
to Forget?” The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp. 43-50.
Chanda, Bankim and a Staﬀ Team (2001). “Emerging Market Financing,”
IMF Quarterly Report on Developments and Prospects, Feb. 13.
Bizer, David S. and Peter M. DeMarzo (1992). “Sequential Banking,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 1.
Eaton, Jonathan and Raquel Fernandez (1995). “Sovereign Debt,” NBER
Working Paper 5131.
Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz (1981). “Debt with Potential Repudia-
tion: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 48, pp. 289-309.
Edwards, Sebastian (1984). “LDC Foreign Borrowing and Default Risk:
An Empirical Investigation, 1976-80,” The American Economic Review,
Vol. 74, No. 4., pp. 726-734.
Edwards, Sebastian (1986). “The Pricing of Bank Loans and Bonds in Inter-
national Financial Market,” European Economic Review, pp. 565-589.
Eichengreen, Barry (1991). “Historical Research on International Lending
and Debt,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 149-
169.
Eichengreen, Barry and Ashoka Mody (1998). “What Explains Changing
Spreads on Emerging-Market Debt: Fundamentals or Market Sentiment?”
NBER Working Paper 6408.
Gibson, Rajna and Suresh Sundaresan (2000). “A Model of Sovereign Bor-
rowing and Sovereign Yield Spreads,” Columbia University Working Paper.
33Kletzer, Kenneth (1984). “Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing
with Sovereign Risk,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 94, No. 374, pp.
287-307.
Parlour, Christine and Uday Rajan (2000). “Competition in Loan Con-
tracts,” forthcoming in The American Economic Review.
Pauly, Mark V. (1974). “Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance:
The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 88, No. 1, pp. 44-62.
34Appendix
In this appendix we summarize a set of necessary conditions for the existence
of the symmetric monopoly equilibrium when the stochastic productivity
shock has a more general distribution than that of the benchmark case of
section 4.
A monopolistic lender in the general model would solve:
max
d;r
p(1 + r)d ¡ d
subject to
pf(d;µ
H)) + (1 ¡ p)°f(d;µ
L) ¡ p(1 + r)d ¸ °f(d;E[˜ µ]) :
This constraint is identical to the one obtained when µL = 0. Therefore, as














Relaxing the assumption that µL = 0 complicates things substantially
because there are now more deviation possibilities for the marginal lender.
For example, the marginal lender could have an incentive to deviate and oﬀer
a contract such that the country is better oﬀ repaying in both states of the
world. This can happen when µL and µH are very close, i.e., when volatility
is low. Nevertheless relaxing the assumption that µL = 0 allows us to analyze
how increases in volatility aﬀect the equilibria. It is in general not possible
to characterize the region where the symmetric monopolistic type outcome
obtains analytically. Therefore, we will explore these equilibria numerically.
We now determine conditions for the symmetric monopolistic default con-
tracts to be sustainable as an equilibrium. As in the case of the competitive
equilibrium analyzed above, we will start by deﬁning loan amounts that
35are of particular interest. As before, the threshold loan size for the low
state, ¯ dL(rD




















The threshold loan size for the high state, ¯ dH(rD








M). In this case, ¯ dH(rD
M) = dD
M.
Clearly then, ¯ dH(rD
M) > ¯ dL(rD
M).
The loan size that maximizes the country’s welfare in the high state,
ˆ dH(rD
M), is deﬁned as ˆ dH(rD
M) = argmaxd pf(d;µH)) + (1 ¡ p)°f(d;µL) ¡
p(1 + rD










The loan size that maximizes the country’s welfare in the low state, ˆ dL(rD
M),
is deﬁned as ˆ dL(rD
M) = argmaxd ¯ µf (d)¡(1+rD











Note that ˆ dH > ˆ dL.
For the symmetric monopolistic contracts to be an equilibrium we need
to ﬁnd conditions such that if all lenders oﬀer the monopolistic contract, the
country will accept all contracts. That is, the country’s demand for loans at
the monopolistic interest rate is at least as big as the total amount oﬀered.
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M) ˆ dL.
The ﬁrst condition indicates that, for the monopolistic outcome to hold, the
country has to be rationed. This is the analog to the condition in Theorem
1. The last two conditions guarantee that the country won’t be better oﬀ
accepting only a fraction of the contracts oﬀered and repaying in both states
of the world.
Given the contracts oﬀered by all other lenders the marginal lender has
three basic options:
1. He can oﬀer the same contract as the others. This needs to be the case
for the symmetric equilibrium to obtain.
2. The marginal lender could oﬀer a contract such that the country is
better oﬀ accepting his contract and a fraction of the contracts oﬀered
by the other lenders. There are two possibilities that we need to check
in this case, since the fraction accepted plus the marginal loan could
be such that the country defaults or not in the low state.
3. Finally, the lender could oﬀer a contract such that the country decides
to take only that contract and reject all the other contracts oﬀered. As
before, this marginal contract could be such that the country decides
to default or not in the low state.
The usual intuition that by oﬀering a lower rate and a larger loan the
marginal lender can make a proﬁt doesn’t necessarily hold in this model,
because the country may have an incentive to take all contracts and default.
For the country to be willing to accept only a fraction of the contracts of-
fered at higher rates, the loan with the lower rate has to be relatively large.
But, for large values of °, the country will tend to be better oﬀ defaulting
than repaying when the loan amounts are large due to the concavity of the
production function.
Given that all other lenders are oﬀering the same monopolistic type con-
tract, the marginal lender, i, will seek to maximize its expected proﬁts subject
37to the best response of the country to the contracts oﬀered. Recall that the
country can choose which contracts to accept and whether to default or not.
This implies two possible strategies for the country which the marginal lender
must consider. The country could default in the low state but repay in the
high state, or it could repay in both states. If the marginal lender decides to
oﬀer a contract such that the country defaults in the low state but repays in
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Hf (di + ÁHD¡i)¡(1+ri)di¡(1+r
D
M)D¡iÁH ¸ °µ
Hf (di + ÁHD¡i) ; (15)
where ÁH is the fraction of the loans oﬀered by the other lenders that the
country chooses to accept.
The ﬁrst constraint guarantees that the country prefers accepting a frac-
tion ÁH of the other loans and repaying in the high state, to taking all loans
and defaulting in both states. The second constraint guarantees repayment in
the high state. It is straightforward to show that the ﬁrst constraint implies
the second.
The country will choose ÁH to maximize its expected utility. Given that
the contracts oﬀered are such that the country defaults in the low state and



















subject to 0 · ÁH · 1.





1 if di < ˆ dH(rD
M) ¡ D¡i
ˆ dH¡di
D¡i if ˆ dH(rD
M) ¡ D¡i · di < ˆ dH(rD
M)
0 if di > ˆ dH(rD
M)
(17)
38Given ÁH, lender i will solve the following maximization problem:
vHi = max
di;ri












¡ p(1 + ri)di




di + D¡i;E[˜ µ]
´
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To solve for vHi we will split the problem into three diﬀerent maxi-
mization problems. We will ﬁnd the marginal lender’s value function for
ÁH = 1;ÁH =
ˆ dH¡di
D¡i and ÁH = 0. Denote these value functions as vH1;i;vH2;i
and vH3;i, respectively. Note that a monopolistic equilibrium requires vH1;i >
vH2;i;vH1;i > vH3;i.
In an analogous way, we can solve for the case where the country repays
in both states, which would yield expected utility for the country denoted by
vLi. Solving the optimization problem analogous to equation (16), implies









D¡i if ˆ dL(rD
M) ¡ D¡i · di < ˆ dL(rD
M)
0 if di > ˆ dL(rD
M) :
As before, to solve for vLi we will split the problem into three diﬀerent
maximizations, and ﬁnd the marginal lender’s value function for ÁL = 1;ÁL =
ˆ dL(rD
M)¡dI
D¡i and ÁL = 0. For the monopolistic outcome to be an equilibrium
we need vH1;i > vL1;i;vH1;i > vL2;i and vH1;i > vL3;i:
Note that although solving these optimization problems that deﬁne the
equilibria is diﬃcult analytically, it is a relatively standard set of constrained
optimization problems that can be easily solved numerically.
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